HOUSTON CRIME LAB UNDER CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION: CRITIC SAYS SITUATION SHOWS "MAJOR GAPS" IN OVERFSIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE;

ACCORDING TO THE CHRONICLE, THE LATENT PRINTS COMPARISON UNIT SUFFERS FROM “SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES WITH STAFFING, A LACK OF PROPER SUPERVISORY REVIEW, INADEQUATE QUALITY CONTROL, TECHNICAL COMPETENCE INCONSISTENT WITH INDUSTRY STANDARDS, INSUFFICIENT TRAINING AND INADEQUATE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.” THE HOUSTON POLICE HAVE CONFIRMED THAT A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO MISCONDUCT BY AT LEAST ONE EMPLOYEE OF THE FINGERPRINT UNIT HAS BEEN OPENED. IN ADDITION TO THE SHODDY WORK THAT WAS DONE, THE UNIT FACES A BACKLOG OF SOME 6000 CASES.

EDWIN COLFAX: THE SEMINAL;

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"Texas has seen more than its share of controversy surrounding forensic science in recent months," Edwin Colfax of the Justice Project writes on The Seminal - the Projects Blog, in a commentary which appeared on January 8, 2010, under the heading "Latest Texas Forensic Flap Shows Major Gaps in Oversight of Scientific Evidence."

"Most recently, the Houston Chronicle reported that an audit of the Houston Crime Lab’s fingerprint division identified problems in more than half of the 548 cases selected for review," Colfax continues.

"The problems discovered were serious enough to lead the authorities to require that more than 4000 violent crime cases from the past six years be reanalyzed—a process that no doubt will be very costly for the city of Houston. According to the Chronicle, the Latent Prints Comparison Unit suffers from “significant deficiencies with staffing, a lack of proper supervisory review, inadequate quality control, technical competence inconsistent with industry standards, insufficient training and inadequate standard operating procedures.” The Houston Police have confirmed that a criminal investigation into misconduct by at least one employee of the fingerprint unit has been opened. In addition to the shoddy work that was done, the unit faces a backlog of some 6000 cases.

These revelations come at a time when a much-needed review of forensic oversight in Texas has been postponed indefinitely.

The Texas Forensic Science Commission had been planning a series of “roundtable” events around the state at which criminal justice stakeholder groups would discuss a recent critical report by the National Academies of Science (NAS), Improving Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, and the implications of the report for forensic science in Texas. That report identified a number of significant shortcomings in the nation’s forensic science system that threaten to undermine the accuracy and integrity of forensic evidence in our courts, including issues of training, bias, resources and a lack of independence and oversight. These same issues are at the heart of the evidence debacle in Houston.

This critical review of the Texas forensic system is on hold because of the Forensic Science Commission has found itself at the center of yet another forensic controversy surrounding its investigation into false arson evidence used against Cameron Willingham, who was executed in 1994. Governor Rick Perry, who turned down a clemency request that included a leading expert’s report that the trial evidence was scientifically invalid, abruptly replaced four commissioners just two days ahead of a meeting at which they were to hear from the state’s arson expert, whose findings confirm that the forensic evidence could not support a finding of arson. That meeting was cancelled by Perry’s new chairman, who is delaying any further action pending the adoption of new rules and policies for the commission he says are needed.

If there could be any doubt that there is an urgent need to act on the NAS report, it was erased by the latest revelations from the Houston Crime Lab. One of the questions that the Commission’s roundtables could be addressing is why Texas law explicitly exempts fingerprint analysis from forensic oversight. Most forensic evidence is only admissible in Texas courts if it is analyzed by an accredited lab, but that is not the case with fingerprints. The latent prints unit in Houston was not accredited, though other divisions in the lab were. While only the beginning of quality assurance, accreditation at least requires some baseline for good quality control policies and management practices (though it does not provide much in the way of ongoing oversight and monitoring of the actual work being done in the labs).

In fact, much fingerprint processing is not associated with a crime labs at all, which is part of the reason Texas law explicitly exempts it from the accreditation requirement. Latent prints forensic work also does not fall under the purview of the Texas Forensic Science Commission, the mission of which is very narrowly applied to investigating allegations of forensic negligence or misconduct in accredited forensic labs. This means that a huge portion of forensic evidence is largely unregulated in Texas.

Texas must recognize that there are serious gaps in its system of forensic oversight. These problems have resulted in innocent people being imprisoned for many years, and they have impeded our ability to convict criminals. The Willingham case raises troubling questions about how forensic methodologies should be validated, and how new scientific developments should be communicated within the criminal justice system. The fingerprint problems encompass many flaws, and show the need for independent laboratories, more robust ongoing oversight, and higher standards for analyst training and certification, among other reforms.

Texas must also recognize that relying on private accreditation programs is an incomplete solution, and that the mission of the Forensic Science Commission is defined in an overly narrow and reactive way. The changes needed are complex and structural—independent laboratories, a commission empowered to set and enforce meaningful quality standards for starters—but we will not be able to meet the challenges until we start the sort of comprehensive review that the Forensic Science Commission had planned. In the meantime, it remains to be seen how many criminal investigations were damaged by the failures in Houston, how many crimes went unsolved, and how many victims might have been denied justice because of a lack of forensic oversight and accountability.

Edwin Colfax is the State Policy Director of The Justice Project, a nonpartisan organization that works to increase fairness and accuracy in the criminal justice system.

The commnentary can be found at:

http://seminal.firedoglake.com/diary/22926

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The Houston Chronicle story Colfax refers to - by reporters Moises Mendoza and Bradley Olson, ran on December 2, 2009, under the heading "HPD fingerprint unit is focus of criminal probe" as follows;

"A Houston Police Department official confirmed Wednesday that a criminal investigation is under way into alleged wrongdoing at HPD's fingerprinting comparison unit, which is under scrutiny following an audit accusing it of shoddy work.

One employee, put on administrative leave with pay after the audit into the unit ended in October, is being investigated for alleged misconduct involving “handling a piece of evidence,” said Tim Oettmeier, an executive assistant chief.

Oettmeier declined to specify what the employee is accused of or name the individual involved.

But he said the allegations emerged after auditors asked employees to do additional work to understand why the unit had such a high error rate. More than half of 548 randomly selected cases involving fingerprints analyzed at the unit have turned up irregularities. Officials released details of the audit on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, Houston's mayor on Wednesday said that criminals likely went free because the fingerprint unit missed prints on evidence. At a news conference, Bill White said he hoped the review would determine how many criminals have been missed.

“I think it's unacceptable the quality of work the chief and the command staff found in the fingerprint unit,” White said.

2 on leave; 1 resigned

Two other employees in the fingerprint unit are not accused of criminal wrongdoing but were put on leave as part of the investigation. A third part-time employee resigned under pressure from the department, Oettmeier said.

Consultants are temporarily doing their jobs while officials decide how to train new fingerprint analysts or hire outsiders.

An attorney with the Houston Police Officers' Union, Bob Armbruster, said the union would represent the three officers on leave, but he said he didn't have enough information to comment.

Because the audit found workers often overlooked fingerprints or wrongly determined fingerprints weren't able to be analyzed, authorities are re-reviewing more than 4,000 violent crime cases involving fingerprints from the last six years. They're also trying to work through a 6,000-case backlog that dates back two years and includes violent and property crimes.

After disclosing the results of the audit Tuesday, authorities emphasized that no cases have been found in which suspects have been wrongly identified because of faulty fingerprint analysis.

They have declined to release the audit publicly, citing the ongoing investigation.
Oettmeier said nobody knows what the six-year review will find, but officials could go back further if evidence of vast irregularities emerge, such as numerous cases of criminals going free or any misidentifications.

“We're not saying that we don't believe there will be false identifications. We are saying we don't know. We have an obligation to look,” Oettmeier said.

Authorities hope re-reviewing cases and clearing the backlog will be done within two years, although there's no way to give a solid timeline, Oettmeier said.

Also unknown is how long the problems at the fingerprint lab have been going on, although it appears likely they've been happening for years, if not decades.
One of the employees on administrative leave worked for the fingerprint unit for 14 years, another for 38 years and a third for 32 years.

The employee who resigned worked full time in the unit from 1972 to 2006 when he retired and was hired part time, police said.

Two other members of the unit — one a trainee and another who works mostly in the field — are still working.

Revelations of severe problems with the unit have rekindled memories of a scandal at the police department's crime lab, which was closed for several years in 2002 after shoddy DNA analysis was revealed.

Forensic independence

The audit has also prompted a range of reactions from local officials, ranging from anguish to satisfaction that the Police Department voluntarily disclosed its problems.

It has also spawned renewed discussion about the need for an independent center to analyze forensic work, possibly including fingerprints.

Much forensic evidence across the country, such as fingerprints or DNA, is analyzed by labs closely tied to law enforcement despite the inherent conflicts of interest, said UCLA law professor Jennifer Mnookin.

Another problem: There are varying standards for how fingerprint analysts are trained and prints are analyzed, meaning some labs are more accurate than others.

“This provides yet another example for why developing validated, research-based models for the field would be a very good idea,” Mnookin said.

Oettmeier said the department was open to independent analysis of evidence. And officials are closely scrutinizing all forensic units at the department, he said. The biggest challenge is rooting out a culture that has allowed such significant problems to fester for years, he said.

“What makes it difficult is some of these issues have probably been around for a long time,” he said."

Harold Levy...hlevy15@gmail.com;