PASSAGE OF THE DAY: "Other law enforcement agencies, including the RCMP and Toronto Police, have explicitly said their IMSI catchers do not have the capability of intercepting private communications, such as calls, text messages, and emails. Instead, they collect identifying data, including an International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and other unique numbers that, with a warrant, can be linked to a suspect’s name and address. This function is also controversial, however, because the devices can sweep up identifying data on thousands of bystanders in addition to targeted suspects. The OPP’s IMSI catcher technology appears to have had the capability of intercepting the private communications of a single, targeted device. But the force would not answer many questions about how it was used, including what type of private communications it captured, how many times this capability was deployed, or how often it had loaned the capability to other forces. “Revealing specifics could jeopardize investigations, ongoing court proceedings and impact public and officer safety,” spokesperson Carolle Dionne responded.“Police services worldwide — including the OPP — recognize the need to build or enhance their capacity to conduct modern criminal investigations involving digital technologies, communications tools and information/data storage.” Critics say more transparency is necessary."
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STORY: "Why did OPP dump cellphone spy tech?, by Science and Technology Reporter Kate Allen, published by The Toronto Star on December 7, 2019.
SUB-HEADING: " Police spent $2 million on invasive 'Stingray' device, but how details of how it was used and why it was later replaced remain secret.
GIST: "The Ontario Provincial Police acquired
“Stingray” cellphone surveillance technology with the power to intercept
private communications, according to documents obtained by the Star — a
device with significantly more invasive capabilities than any other
Canadian police force is known to have.
The
OPP obtained the hardware five years ago. But a spokesperson says the
force switched to equipment “not capable” of intercepting private
communications in 2017. The force did not respond to questions about why
it switched, or what happened to the previous device or devices, for
which it ultimately paid more than $2 million. The
technology, known by a variety of names including IMSI catchers, Cell
Site Simulators and Stingrays, mimics a cellphone tower, forcing nearby
mobile devices to connect and collecting information from them. Other
law enforcement agencies, including the RCMP and Toronto Police, have
explicitly said their IMSI catchers do not have the capability of
intercepting private communications, such as calls, text messages, and
emails. Instead, they collect identifying data, including an
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and other unique numbers
that, with a warrant, can be linked to a suspect’s name and address. This function is also controversial, however, because the devices can sweep up identifying data on thousands of bystanders in addition to targeted suspects. The
OPP’s IMSI catcher technology appears to have had the capability of
intercepting the private communications of a single, targeted device.
But the force would not answer many questions about how it was used,
including what type of private communications it captured, how many
times this capability was deployed, or how often it had loaned the
capability to other forces. “Revealing
specifics could jeopardize investigations, ongoing court proceedings
and impact public and officer safety,” spokesperson Carolle Dionne
responded.
“Police
services worldwide — including the OPP — recognize the need to build or
enhance their capacity to conduct modern criminal investigations
involving digital technologies, communications tools and
information/data storage.” Critics say more transparency is necessary. “When
it comes to surveillance tools, there needs to be a social licence for
the use of them: the public needs to understand what’s being used, what
the capacity is, and what accountability structures are in place to
ensure that they’re used reasonably, proportionately, and fairly,” says
Brenda McPhail, director of the privacy, technology and surveillance
project at the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. “If
we don’t even know that the tools with that capacity are in use in our
jurisdictions, we can’t possibly ask or be given the right level of
public accountability about whether or not they are being used in ways
that we as a society believe are appropriate.” The Star filed an access to information request for records related to the OPP’s IMSI catchers in January 2016. The provincial ministry responsible for law enforcement
first refused to confirm or deny it had any such records, and later
refused to release the records on multiple grounds, including that doing
so would reveal investigative techniques currently or likely to be
used, rendering those techniques ineffective. The
Star argued that the public should be given enough information about
this technology to properly weigh the tradeoff between privacy and
security. After
a years-long appeal process, the Ontario Information and Privacy
Commissioner’s office (IPC) ruled last month that some documents related
to the OPP’s acquisition and use of these devices must be released to
the Star. Significant parts of the documents were redacted, upholding
the ministry’s concerns about revealing investigative techniques. The
documents include contracts, purchase orders and a 2014 deployment
protocol. The protocol is almost totally redacted except for a cover
page and four sentences broadly describing the device’s capabilities. The
protocol shows that the OPP’s IMSI catcher could detect a cellular
device’s identifying characteristics, deny cellular service to a
specific device while not affecting others in the area, locate and track
a device, and intercept “the private communications originated by and
received by a specific cellular device.” Sherry
Liang, IPC assistant commissioner of tribunal services, ruled this
information should be disclosed because it simply describes general
functionalities corresponding to publicly available information about
these devices. Liang ruled that two
more pages containing information that “would reveal more than the
public already knows” about the capabilities of these devices should not
be released. Some IMSI catchers can
not only intercept calls and texts but edit and reroute them, and can
remotely activate a cellphone’s microphone. The OPP did not answer when
asked whether its device had these capabilities. The
ministry also sought to prevent the release of these documents because
it would prejudice a long-term, ongoing relationship between the OPP and
another governmental organization. The organization’s name is redacted.
In 2017, the RCMP gave an unprecedented media briefing in which it revealed it
owned 10 IMSI catchers. It gave investigators from the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada access to the devices to confirm that they were
not capable of intercepting private communications. The RCMP always
seeks judicial authorization to use these devices, except in exceptional
and urgent circumstances, like kidnappings. Asked
whether the RCMP collaborated on investigations with the OPP or other
police forces that own IMSI catchers capable of intercepting private
communications, spokesperson Caroline Duval said “The RCMP does not
report on investigations that are ongoing, or investigations that are
led by other agencies or departments.” The Star revealed in March that
Toronto Police recently acquired an IMSI catcher. Prior to that it had
used the technology in at least five separate investigations; in three
of them, it relied on the RCMP’s devices. Toronto
Police spokesperson Meaghan Gray said that “TPS has not used an IMSI
[catcher] (ours or anyone else’s) for the purpose of intercepting
private communications.” The
OPP says its current IMSI catcher technology “is only used to collect
transmission data in relation to mobile devices,” is used in major
criminal investigations, and that a specific warrant related to this
type of data is used to authorize its deployment. The force will not
disclose the number of IMSI catchers it owns, because that information is operational in nature.""
The entire story can be read at:
https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2019/12/07/documents-reveal-opps-powerful-cellphone-spy-tech-why-does-it-no-longer-use-it.htmlPUBLISHER'S NOTE: I am monitoring this case/issue. Keep your eye on the Charles Smith Blog for reports on developments. The Toronto Star, my previous employer for more than twenty incredible years, has put considerable effort into exposing the harm caused by Dr. Charles Smith and his protectors - and into pushing for reform of Ontario's forensic pediatric pathology system. The Star has a "topic" section which focuses on recent stories related to Dr. Charles Smith. It can be found at: http://www.thestar.com/topic/charlessmith. Information on "The Charles Smith Blog Award"- and its nomination process - can be found at: http://smithforensic.blogspot.com/2011/05/charles-smith-blog-award-nominations.html Please send any comments or information on other cases and issues of interest to the readers of this blog to: hlevy15@gmail.com. Harold Levy: Publisher: The Charles Smith Blog;
